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FROM NATURAL RESOURCES TO NATURAL ASSETS*
JAMES K. BOYCE
ABSTRACT
This article examines the scope for strategies to build natural assets in the hands
of low-income individuals and communities. Natural assets include sources of raw
materials such as forests and fisheries, and the airsheds, lands, and water bodies
that provide "environmental sinks" for the disposal of wastes. These resources
become assets when people have rights to access their benefits. Four strategies for
natural asset-building are identified: investment to increase the total stock of
natural assets; redistribution to transfer natural assets from others; internalization
to increase the ability of the poor to capture benefits generated by their
stewardship of natural assets; and appropriation to establish rights for the poor to
open-access resources. Building on the democratic principle that all individuals
have equal rights to clean air, clean water, and other common heritage resources,
these strategies simultaneously can advance the goals of poverty reduction,
environmental protection, and environmental justice.
Natural assets are the myriad forms of wealth created by nature. They include the
land on which we live and grow our food and fiber; the water we drink and use to
irrigate crops, generate electricity, and dispose of wastes; the atmosphere that
envelops our planet; the fish in the ocean, the trees in the forest and all other
animals and plants, wild and domesticated; ores, minerals, and fossil fuels; and
the
'This article is adapted from an introductory chapter in the forthcoming book,  Natural Assets: Democratizing
Environmental Ownership, edited by James K. Boyce and Barry Shelley, and is presented here by permission of
the author.
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energy of the sun that powers the biosphere. Natural assets are the wealth on which
human well-being-and survival itself-ultimately depends.
Nature sustains human livelihoods in two fundamental ways: first, as the source of
raw materials for the production of goods and services; and second, as the
"environmental sink" for the disposal of wastes generated by our production and
consumption. Both kinds of natural assets are often diminished by human activities:
we have depleted nature's sources and overfilled nature's sinks. But humans can also
invest so as to increase the amount of natural assets. One avenue for such
investment is "ecological restoration," measures such as reforestation, the
replenishment of fisheries, and the clean-up of polluted land and water that increase
natural assets by repairing some of the damages inflicted by human activities in the
past. Another avenue is human engagement in the web of life, the evolutionary
processes that constantly shape and reshape the living world. From the standpoint of
human well-being, perhaps the most important example of such engagement is the
domestication of rice, wheat, maize, and other crops, beginning roughly 400 human
generations ago, and the subsequent evolution of the many thousands of diverse
varieties of these crops today cultivated by farmers around the world.
NATURAL ASSETS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING
Although natural resources are the common heritage of humankind, access to
them is filtered through human institutions. Resources become assets only when
people have rights to them. As with other kinds of assets, some people typically have
more natural assets than others. The resulting distributional imbalances have long
been a source of social struggles, and in recent decades they have fueled popular
movements and public policies advocating environmental protection and
environmental justice. Environmental protection seeks to maintain the quality and
quantity of natural assets for present and future generations: it promotes
inter-generational equity. Environmental justice promotes equity within the current
generation, by demanding that natural assets-in particular, access to clean air and
water-are distributed fairly.
These environmental aspirations are sometimes held to be at odds with another
central social goal: poverty reduction. It is claimed that the poor face a grim but
inescapable tradeoff between higher incomes and a better environment. This article
challenges this conventional wisdom, maintaining instead that strategies for building
natural assets in the hands of low-income individuals and communities can
simultaneously advance the goals of poverty reduction, environmental protection,
and environmental justice.
Poverty is not simply a lack of income today, but a lack of assets to yield income
and other benefits tomorrow. This insight is the starting point for the asset-based
approach to poverty reduction. It was applied by Michael Sherraden [1] and Melvin
Oliver and Thomas Shapiro [2] to financial assets and real estate. MoreNATURAL RESOURCES TO NATURAL ASSETS / 269
recently, it has been applied to "human capital," in the form of health and education,
and "social capital," in the form of community organizations and the bonds of trust
that underpin cooperation. Natural assets too can play an important role in poverty
reduction.
Asset-based strategies for poverty reduction have two compelling advantages over
conventional income-based strategies. First, income transfers offer only temporary
relief from poverty: unless today's income is followed by more tomorrow, the impact
of such transfers is transitory. Assets generate income now and in the future,
offering a long-term escape from poverty rather than a mere reprieve. Second, assets
provide a source of leverage, enabling their owners to gain indirect benefits above
and beyond those inherent in the asset itself, from more favorable access to credit
markets to greater social standing and power. As Oliver and Shapiro remark,
"Income supplies the necessities of life, while wealth represents a kind of `surplus'
resource available for improving life chances, providing further opportunities,
securing prestige, passing status along to one's family, and influencing the political
process" [2, p. 32].
Natural asset-building can, and often does, go together with building other types
of assets. For example, Manuel Pastor reports that toxic waste facilities in
metropolitan Los Angeles are disproportionately located in those poor and
predominantly minority communities that are experiencing "ethnic churning," with
new minorities moving in as others move out [3]. The reason, he suggests, is that
stable communities are richer in social capital-informal networks as well as formal
community organizations-and hence better able to resist the siting of hazardous
facilities in their midst.
Just as social capital can contribute to natural asset-building, successful efforts to
build natural assets can strengthen a community's social capital. A movement to
resist the imposition of toxic facilities may set the stage for other community-based
campaigns, such as demands for better schools, housing, and public services. In
Chelsea, Massachusetts, for example, local efforts to access and restore the riverfront
have helped to spark the rise of community organizations [4].
Natural assets have several features that distinguish them from financial wealth
and real estate. First, the benefits that flow from access to natural assets include not
only income, but also crucial non-income benefits such as health and environmental
quality. Poverty in these dimensions of well-being can be as serious as low incomes.
Natural assets share this feature in common with other types of unconventional
assets-including education and community organizations that also contribute to the
non-income dimensions of well-being.
Second, the principle that every person has an equal right to natural assets has a
wide appeal. Two centuries ago, the revolutionary democrat Tom Paine declared that
land is "the free gift of the Creator in common to the human race," and proposed
that the income from leasing it for individuals to use should be distributed equitably
among all citizens [5]. In a similar vein, many people would agree with the
proposition that rights to the air we breathe should be equally270 / BOYCE
distributed. To be sure, public policies in the United States and elsewhere have often
skirted this issue, granting rights to natural resources and environmental services to
the first party that finds a way to seize them. Yet the principle of equal rights to
common-heritage resources remains a powerful ideal.
Finally, as the example of access to clean air suggests, rights to natural resources
are often imprecisely defined. A great variety of ownership regimes characterize
natural assets: some resources are owned by individuals or firms as private property;
some are held by communities as common property; some are held by governments
as public property; and some are open-access resources, owned by no one and
available in theory to all, but in practice to those with the power to appropriate them.
The "bundle of sticks" that constitutes the set of property rights to a given natural
asset is often divided among different parties [6]. A farmer, for example, may own
the surface rights to a tract of land, and a coal company may hold rights to the
minerals beneath it, while the air above is an open-access resource. Many sticks in the
property-rights bundle lie somewhere between the polar cases of perfectly defined
rights and perfectly unrestricted open access. Do downstream water users, for
example, deserve redress if the activities of an upstream landowner decrease the
quantity or quality of water available to them? If the government institutes
regulations to protect the watershed, does this infringe on the constitutional
guarantee that private property shall not be "taken for public use, without just
compensation"? The answers to such questions have changed over time, and as
rights to natural resources are defined and redefined, the natural assets of the poor
can expand-or shrink.
RETHINKING THE ENVIRONMENT AND
THE ECONOMY
Long before the rise of market economies, people relied on assets for their
livelihoods and well-being. Even today, when markets mediate our access to many
goods and services, much that is vital to a person's quality of life remains outside the
sphere of market exchange. The nexus linking the various types of assets to the
various dimensions of human well-being include non-market activities as well as
market exchanges (see Figure 1).
Humans versus Nature?
Environmental debates in the United States have often pitted proponents of
wilderness preservation against proponents of "rational use." Preservationists
typically base their case on the linkages in the top half of Figure 1. They stress the
importance of natural assets, non-market activities, and the non-income dimensions
of human well-being. The deep-ecology variant of the preservationist school goes
further, arguing that the "rights of nature" should trump human well--being as the
ethical basis for public policy [7]. Advocates of rational usetypically base their case on the linkages in the bottom half of Figure 1. They are
inclined to see the market as the measure of all things. The libertarian variant of the
rational-use school goes further, arguing not only that free markets maximize
well-being, but also that individual "freedom to choose" should be the overriding
social goal [8].
Notwithstanding their profound and often acrimonious differences, both sides in
this debate share certain premises. Both juxtapose nature to humans, and the
environment to the economy, differing only in which side they favor and think will
ultimately prevail. The preservationists believe that in the absence of strict controls,
the magnitude of adverse human impacts on the environment will overwhelm
nature's capacity for resource renewal and waste assimilation; the proponents of
market rationality believe that human ingenuity, guided by price signals, will find a
way around environmental constraints. Both sides also typically show little concern
for the poor: in the preservationist paradigm, the poor are to be fenced out of nature
lest they trample upon it; in the greed-as-virtue paradigm, the poor are simply
consigned to their free-market fates.
This article is based on an alternative vision, in which humans are not apart from
nature but a part of it. Since at least the advent of agriculture, humans have shaped
and reshaped their environment. "Nature," as William Cronon remarks, "is not nearly
so natural as it seems" [9, p. 25]. The environmental impacts of human activity are
not invariably negative: humans certainly can degrade the environment, but they can
also improve it by investing in natural capital. Furthermore, the poor-when they have
access to natural resources-often play key roles in making and maintaining such
investments.
The acequia communities of the Upper Rio Grande watershed, described by Devon
Pena [10], provide a striking example. As long ago as the 1500s, Hispanic farmers
constructed gravity-flow irrigation channels (acequias) in what is now northern New
Mexico, transforming arid lands into a rich, biologically diverse
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agricultural ecosystem. Today these acequias are maintained by their descendants, who
thereby provide environmental services including soil conservation, water filtration
and retention, the preservation of habitats for wild animals and plants, and the
conservation of crop genetic diversity. Rather than short-sighted despoilers of
nature, humans are the "keystone species" of this ecosystem. Human activity
produced a new landscape, and continued human engagement is required to
maintain it.
In terming such environmental changes "improvements," we make a value
judgment founded on concern for human well-being in present and future
generations. We are deeply committed to protecting the environment not because we
see nature as more important than humans, or more worthy of respect, but because
we understand that humans and nature are inextricably bound together.
Winners versus Losers
The humans-versus-nature dichotomy not only ignores the potential for people to
invest in natural assets. It also diverts our gaze from the contests among people who
are crucial to the dynamics of pollution and resource depletion. Environmentally
degrading economic activities involve winners as well as losers. The winners are
those who benefit as producers or consumers by "externalizing" costs, that is, by
their capacity to impose costs on others from whom they are distanced by time,
place, and income. The losers are those who bear the costs of depleted resources and
a polluted environment. Without the winners, environmental degradation would not
occur. Without the losers, there would be no reason to worry about it from the
standpoint of human well-being.
To grasp the causes of environmental degradation-and to understand why more of
it occurs in some times and places than in others-we must ask why the winners are
able to impose environmental costs on the losers. There are three possible reasons.
First, the losers may not yet exist: they belong to future generations who are not
here to defend themselves. In these cases, the only feasible solution is to nurture an
inter-generational ethic of gratitude toward those who preceded us, and responsibility
towards those who will follow.
Second, the losers may exist but be unaware of their position: they lack adequate
information about environmental impacts, and hence do not try to defend
themselves. These cases underscore the importance of research and education on the
environment in general, and of right-to-know legislation in particular.
Finally, the losers may exist and know it, but lack the power to prevent the
winners from imposing costs on them. In such cases, the extent of pollution and
resource depletion is shaped by the distribution of power: the greater the power of
the winners vis-à-vis the losers, the greater the extent of environmental degradation.
Hence a solution requires a more equitable distribution of power [11].NATURAL RESOURCES TO NATURAL ASSETS / 273
Empirical evidence suggests that this third explanation-based on power disparities
between winners and losers-is relevant in many cases. In the United States, states
with wider inequalities of power (as measured by an index derived from data on
voter participation, tax fairness, Medicaid access, and the percentage of adults with a
high school education) tend to have weaker environmental policies, higher
environmental stress, and worse public health [12]. Internationally, countries with
more equal income distribution, greater political rights and civil liberties, and higher
adult literacy-indicators of a more equitable distribution of power-tend to have less
air pollution, less water pollution, and wider access to clean drinking water and
sanitation facilities [13].
Links between Asset Building and
Environmental Protection
Strategies that expand the natural asset base of the poor can further the goal of
environmental protection in several ways. First, given the correlation between wealth
and power, any strategy that increases the assets of the poor-natural or otherwise-will
tend to improve their ability to resist having environmental costs imposed on them
by others. Low-income and minority communities in the United States often face
disproportionate environmental burdens [3, 14-17]. In effect, the poor subsidize
corporate polluters by allowing them to avoid the costs of pollution control [18].
Strengthening the power of communities to combat these perverse subsidies is one
of the ways in which natural asset building can further the goal of environmental
protection.
A second link operates via the effects of asset distribution on the economic
valuation of the environment. Research by economists and psychologists has shown
that valuations based on people's willingness to accept compensation for
environmental damages typically exceed those based on their willingness to pay to
prevent the same damages. For example, when people are asked how much they
would have to be paid to agree to breathe dirty air, they typically name a higher price
than when they are asked how much they would be willing to pay not to breathe it.
The difference rests on the implicit assignments of property rights. In the first case,
the people have the right to clean air; they can impose charges on would-be polluters.
In the second case, the polluters have the right to foul the air; the public must bribe
them to limit pollution. The resulting valuations differ for two main reasons: First,
willingness to pay is constrained by ability to pay, whereas willingness to accept
payment is not. Second, ownership of a natural resource often instills a greater sense
of moral responsibility to safeguard it [19, 20]. This means that the amount that a
society is prepared to spend for environmental protection will hinge, in part, on the
distribution of natural assets and other wealth. Even if social decisions about
environmental protection were thoroughly insulated from the effects of power
disparities between winners and losers-and were guided instead solely by the
"efficiency" criterion of comparing274 / BOYCE
benefits to costs-building natural assets in the hands of the poor would help to
protect the environment by raising the economic valuation of the benefits.
A third link arises from the impact of asset ownership on what economists term
the "real cost of labor." From brownfields redevelopment and urban agriculture to
sustainable forest management and the conservation of crop genetic diversity, labor
is often a key input in investments in natural capital [21-24]. The supply of labor
tends to be higher-or put differently, its cost tends to be lower-when people work for
themselves than when they work for others. One reason is that many people prefer
to be their own bosses; another is there is no need to spend money on supervision to
make people work harder [25]. This labor-cost advantage helps to explain why family
farming remains widespread in the United States and other industrialized countries,
and why throughout the world small farms tend to yield more output per acre than
large farms [26-28]. In the same vein, we can expect that more labor will be invested
in restoring and building natural assets when their ownership rests in the hands of
those who are providing the labor than when wage labor must be hired for this
purpose.
A final connection between asset ownership and environmental protection arises
from the importance of local knowledge. The members of local communities often
have specialized knowledge about the characteristics and use of natural resources
[10, 24, 29]. Yet the poor often lack the rights that would enable them to put this
knowledge fully to use. By bridging the gap between rights and knowledge, building
natural assets in the hands of the poor again can contribute to environmental quality.
In all these respects, how we relate to each other has a profound effect on how
we relate to the environment. In a society where wealth and power are concentrated
in the hands of a few, the ability of the powerful to impose environmental costs on
others is greater than in a society where wealth and power are distributed more
democratically. Insofar as social decisions are guided by considerations of
"efficiency," wide inequalities of wealth and power further undermine environmental
protection by reducing the supposed economic value of its benefits to the poor
majority. Insofar as the labor and knowledge of the poor are important for the
maintenance and sustainable use of natural assets, strategies that expand their rights
to these assets will foster environmental stewardship.
BUILDING NATURAL ASSETS
There are four main routes to increase the amount and value of natural assets in
the hands of the poor: 1) investment, the creation of new natural capital or the
improvement of natural capital to which the poor already have access; 2) redis-
tribution, the transfer of natural capital from others to the poor; 3) internalization,
increases in the ability of the poor to capture benefits flowing from natural capital
they already own; and 4) appropriation, the establishment of rights for the poor to
open-access resources (see Figure 2). The first two routes, investment andredistribution, are applicable to many other types of assets; the latter two routes,
internalization and appropriation, are based on special features of certain natural
assets.
1. Investment
In recent years, the dismal notion that human activity inexorably depreciates
natural capital-our only choice being how rapidly to do so-has been giving way to a
more positive vision, founded on the recognition that humans can invest in natural
capital [30]. Such investment offers a route to expand the natural asset base of the
poor. For the poor, this route is particularly relevant in cases where they already own
or have access to natural assets whose quantity and quality can be increased.
An example is the case of farmlands owned by poor people. Historically, the soil
and water conservation programs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which aim
to support investments in natural capital, often have discriminated against
low-income farmers in general and people of color in particular [31]. If this pattern
were reversed-that is, if government support were preferentially directed to poor and
minority farmers, instead of away from them-such programs could form part
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of a natural asset-building strategy for the reduction of rural poverty. More generally,
many of the world's poor suffer from "ecological poverty," in which their livelihoods
are constrained by the impoverishment of the natural resources on which they rely;
in such settings, ecological restoration can go hand-in-hand with poverty reduction
[32].
Politically, investment is likely to be the least controversial route to natural asset
building, since it adds to the stock of natural capital without impinging directly on
the rights of others. The poor obtain assets as the total asset pie grows, but no one
else loses assets they already have. In this respect, such a progressive investment
strategy is akin to the "redistribution with growth" strategy advocated by
reform-minded economists at the World Bank in the 1970s: the strategy assumed
that redistribution of the existing national income pie was politically infeasible, and
instead sought to channel increments from an expanding pie into the hands of the
poor [33]. The investment route to natural asset building applies this logic to stocks
of assets rather than to flows of income.
2. Redistribution
Redistribution is a second route to increase the stock of assets in the hands of the
poor. In the case of natural capital, this route is particularly relevant to non-renewable
resources such as land and minerals, the supply of which cannot be increased by
investment.
Asset redistribution can be expected to be more contentious than progressive
strategies for investment. But when inequalities in asset ownership are great,
redistribution can offer the single most effective route to build the asset base of the
poor. As Oliver and Shapiro remark:
[O]ur analysis clearly suggests the need for massive redistributional
policies in order to reforge the links between achievement, reward,
social equality, and democracy. These policies must take aim at the
gross inequality generated by those at the very top of the wealth
distribution. Policies of this type are the most difficult ones on which
to gain consensus but the most important in creating a more just
society [2, p. 9].
Land reform-the transfer of rights from large landowners to tenant farmers and
landless laborers-is the best-known example of redistribution-led natural asset
building. Land reform was a key element in the successful post-World War II
economic development strategies of countries such as China, Taiwan, and Korea.
The potential for redistribution is not limited, however, to the agricultural sectors of
developing countries. In inner-city Boston, the Dudley Street Neighborhood
Initiative won the power of eminent domain in the course of a struggle for
community-based redevelopment of vacant lots [34, 35].
In the "bundle of sticks" that constitutes the rights to a property, redistribution
can involve specific sticks rather than the whole bundle. Land reforms, for example,
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threat of eviction, in return for a legally specified share of the crop-rather than full
title to the land. In brownfields redevelopment, local communities similarly have
won certain rights-such as the right to participate in land-use decisions, or to share in
employment opportunities-without taking outright ownership of redeveloped land
[21]. In forestry stewardship, there is also the potential for redistributing employment
to reduce poverty in communities dependent on publicly owned forests [23]. In
effect, the right to employment can serve as a vehicle for access to income from
natural assets.
3. Internalization
When the poor own natural assets that generate benefits to others, for which they
currently receive no reward, internalization offers another route to asset-building. For
example, the crop genetic diversity that is sustained by small farmers around the
world is the ultimate foundation for food security worldwide, providing the raw
material for adaptations to new pests, plant diseases, and climate change. Yet the
farmers who perform this vital service receive no compensation for doing so. In the
language of economics, they generate "positive externalities" for others. Policies to
reward farmers for this service-that is, to internalize some of the benefits that flow
from their management of natural assets-could help both to reduce poverty and to
safeguard invaluable biological resources [24].
Similarly, farmers and forest landowners in watersheds that serve metropolitan
areas provide an ecological service in regulating the quantity and quality of water that
flows from their land. In effect, they are engaged in two forms of production: the
production of crops, livestock, and timber, for which they are compensated by the
market; and the production of water, for which they are not compensated. In some
cases, the value of the latter exceeds that of the former. Devon Pena reports, for
example, that the ecological services provided by the "anthropogenic wetlands" of
acequia farmers in the Upper Rio Grande bioregion are worth more than the value of
their agricultural produce [10]. Connie Best reports that the value of carbon
sequestration services provided by forests can exceed their value for timber [29].
Again, mechanisms to reward cash-poor farmers and forest owners for providing
these ecological services could help to reduce poverty and create incentives to keep
providing them.
In pursuing internalization strategies, several key issues arise: Who will finance the
compensation payments? How will compensation be delivered, with what mix of
individual and community rewards? To what extent should compensation
mechanisms preferentially target the poor, rather than simply rewarding all providers
of ecological services regardless of their wealth or income? Finally, insofar as the
internalization of benefits increases the market value of the natural assets, how can
the poor defend these assets from others who might seek to wrest control of them?
If these issues are properly resolved, internalization can be a promising route for
natural asset building, since the assets in question are already in the hands278 / BOYCE
of the poor, and a compelling case can be made for internalizing environmental
externalities on efficiency grounds.
4. Appropriation
Appropriation, the final route to natural asset building, pertains specifically to
"open-access" resources. These resources are nobody's property, and so they are
vulnerable to overuse in what Garrett Hardin termed the "tragedy of the commons"
[36]. The paradigmatic case is that of an open-entry grazing commons, where each
livestock owner gets the full benefit of grazing his animals, while bearing only a
small fraction of the cost of thereby reducing the forage available to all. In the
absence of either government regulation or privatization, overgrazing is the
predictable result. Research by scholars such as Elinor Ostrom [37] has drawn
attention to a third possible solution, based on the difference between an open -
access commons and property owned in common: throughout the world, we find
common-property regimes with informal but effective rules that have supported the
sustained joint use of natural resources such as grazing lands, forests, and fisheries.
Instead of the "tragedy of the commons," therefore, it is more precise to speak of
the "tragedy of open access."
In practice, open access often leads to not one tragedy but two: the abuse of
natural resources, and their appropriation by the powerful at the expense of others.
In theory, open-access resources are freely available to all, yet in practice open access
can be quite inequitable: in the scramble for "free" natural resources, some people
are more equal than others. In open-access fisheries, for example, the advantage goes
to those who can field the most efficient-or ruthless-extractive fishing technologies.
In the case of environmental sinks, everyone may have the same right to pollute the
airsheds, lands, and water bodies into which we discard wastes, but not all have equal
means to do so. The law that prescribes the same penalty for anyone who steals a
loaf of bread-no matter whether the thief is a starving mother or a millionaire-is a
hollow form of equality. So too is the fact that a poor family living near a chemical
factory has the same right to pollute the air as the factory's owners.
The democratic appropriation of rights to open-access natural resources could
address both tragedies. For example, Peter Barnes and Marc Breslow have proposed
to establish a "sky trust" funded by fees on carbon emissions, with the revenues
disbursed equally to every woman, man, and child in the United States [38]. The
environmental goal is to reduce the burning of fossil fuels and the threat of global
warming by charging rent for skyborne carbon storage, at present an open-access
resource. Lower-income households, who generally consume less of everything,
including fossil fuels, would pay less into the fund than upper-income households,
but all would receive the same payout per person. The majority of U.S. households
would receive more in dividends than they would pay in higher fuel prices. With the
fees calibrated to cut carbon emissions enough to meet theNATURAL RESOURCES TO NATURAL ASSETS / 279
targets in the Kyoto global climate accord, the net effect of the sky trust would be to
increase the net incomes of the poorest 10 percent of families by about five percent,
while reducing those of the richest 10 percent by slightly less than one percent. A
recent Congressional Budget Office study compares the effects of this proposal to
the alternative of using the proceeds from a carbon tax to finance a cut in corporate
income taxes [39].
Community struggles against toxic pollution offer another example of natural
asset-building via the appropriation route: communities are claiming rights to protect
airsheds and water bodies that have been treated in the past as open-access
environmental sinks. Indeed, the right to live in a clean and healthy environmental
right increasingly affirmed in state constitutions and judicial decisions throughout
the world [40, 41]-implies a radically egalitarian distribution of rights to this subset of
natural assets. Insofar as communities are able to secure these rights, they strengthen
their bargaining positions with would-be polluters. The benefits from this type of
community-based natural asset-building include better health, improved
environmental quality, and higher property values.
In theory, communities could also gain income as compensation for any pollution
they are willing to accept within the bounds set by environmental regulations. Such
compensation-an application of the "polluter pays principle"-would not imply that
regulatory agencies should adopt more relaxed pollution standards. Rather, it is
based on the principle that as owners of their environment, communities have a
right to compensation for pollution within the legal limits.
The four routes to natural asset-building identified above often overlap in
practice. Forest stewardship, for example, can combine the internalization of benefits
generated by forest ecosystems with new investment in watershed management.
Brownfields redevelopment can combine the appropriation of the right to a clean
environment, the redistribution of property rights from absentee landowners to
community-based organizations, and investments in cleanup and new development.
Alone or in combination, these routes can expand the natural asset base of the poor,




Natural asset-building strategies must be situated against the background of a
society's political economy and its ideas of normative justice. In the United States, a
long tradition in political thought holds that property rights and democracy go
hand-in-hand. Democracy protects the citizens against usurpation of their property
rights by a political elite; widely dispersed property ownership protects democracy
against subordination to an economic elite. This relationship rests on an egalitarian
foundation: all citizens have the right to vote, and all have the right to own property.
For democracy to flourish, citizens must not only hold these rights in280 / BOYCE
theory but also exercise them in practice. When wealth is instead concentrated in the
hands of a few, the mutually supportive relationship between property rights and
democracy is replaced by one of tension, as the rich seek to translate economic
muscle into political control, and the poor seek to use their political majority for
economic gain.
In the late 18th century, the link between land and liberty was evident to the
American revolutionaries. With the subsequent growth of the U.S. economy and the
rise of the manufacturing and service sectors, the Jeffersonian vision of independent
landowning farmers as the cornerstone of American democracy has faded. Yet the
close relation between wealth and power-and hence between the distribution of
assets and the viability of democracy-remains as relevant today as it was during the
founding of the Republic. And today, no less than in our agrarian past, natural
resources and environmental sinks continue to undergird the U.S. economy and
those of other industrialized countries. It is hard to pin numbers on benefits that
bypass the market, but Robert Costanza and colleagues have estimated the annual
value of ecosystem services worldwide to be $33 trillion nearly double the value of
the total world GNP [42].
Tom Paine's egalitarian claim that land is a gift in common to the human race
applies equally well to other natural resources. By fostering a more equitable
distribution of this inheritance, building natural assets in the hands of the poor can
strengthen the foundations of a democratic society.
States and Markets
The degree to which a society can be called democratic or oligarchic is not a
matter of whether it accords a larger role in economic affairs to the market or the
state. States and markets function democratically when power and wealth,
respectively, are widely diffused, and oligarchically when they are highly
concentrated.
Real-world societies lie on continuums in terms of both their degree of democ-
racy and their institutional mix of the state and the market (see Figure 3). For the last
two centuries, the contending ideologies of right and left have often sought to
collapse these two dimensions into a single axis: the right has identified democracy
with the market and oligarchy with the state, while the left has made the opposite
equation. Whichever way the axes are rotated, however, neither the market nor the
state has proven to be a trustworthy shortcut to democracy.
For example, many economists advocate tradable emission permits-pollution
allowances that can be sold if a company doesn't need all it owns-as a market-based
alternative to "command-and-control" pollution regulations. Such permits represent
a movement along the state-market continuum in the market direction. In the 1990
Clean Air Act amendments, Congress introduced tradable permits for emissions of
sulfur dioxide (S02), a health hazard and a major source of acid rain. Aiming to cut
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2000, the government issued a limited number of permits for emissions by electric
power plants, and allowed them to be traded among the utilities; in 1999, the going
market price was roughly $125 per ton of S02 emissions [43]. Firms that can cut
emissions cheaply (relative to the price of permits) do so, while other firms buy
permits. This flexibility, compared to the conventional one-rule-fits-all approach to
pollution regulation, is supposed to achieve the overall pollution-reduction goal at
the least total cost.
Permit-trading schemes have certain drawbacks compared to conventional
regulations: the administrative costs of monitoring compliance may be higher when
firms are free to choose different levels of pollution control and different
technologies for this purpose; and the clustering of permits in particular geographical
areas can create pollution "hot spots" even as national or regional emission targets
are met. The balance between the pro's and con's of each policy will vary from case
to case.282 / BOYCE
Is one alternative intrinsically more "democratic" than the other? Some advocates
of "free-market environmentalism," axiomatically identifying markets with
democracy, make this claim. Yet the degree to which a permit-trading scheme can be
called democratic depends crucially on how it is implemented: how the pollution
reduction goals are determined, and how permits are distributed. If the public is
well-informed about the extent and impacts of pollution and participates in defining
pollution reduction targets, and if safeguards are put in place to prevent the
emergence of hot spots where residents are exposed to excessive pollution, a
permit-trading scheme is more democratic than if these conditions do not hold. If
the permits are auctioned off every year, and the resulting revenue equally shared
among the citizenry, as in the "sky trust" proposed by Barnes and Breslow, the
scheme is more democratic than if the permits are handed out for free to polluters-in
effect, ratifying their prior appropriation of environmental sinks-as happened in the
case of S02 permits. Similarly, the degree to which conventional pollution regulations
can be considered democratic depends on the extent of public engagement in
decision-making and on how the resulting costs and benefits are shared.
Just as tradable emission permits or "green taxes" can give firms an incentive to
limit pollution, compensation payments or "green subsidies" can provide owners of
natural resources with an incentive to manage them so as to provide ecosystem
services such as watershed management, biodiversity conservation, and carbon
sequestration. In the parlance of economists, the former instruments serve to
internalize "external costs" (or "negative externalities"); the latter serve to internalize
"external benefits" (or "positive externalities"). In both cases, the state creates these
instruments to redress the failure of the market to provide adequate incentives for
environmental protection.
Yet government failure can be just as serious as market failure: there is no
automatic guarantee that the state will "do the right thing," accurately calibrating its
interventions to redress market failures and advance the public good. Whereas the
market responds to the price signals that emerge from a given distribution of wealth
and income, the state responds to the political signals that emerge from a given
distribution of power. Hence it is no accident that public monies ostensibly meant to
serve the national interest in timber produc tion and forest management have flowed
disproportionately to wealthy forest owners [44].
Democratic accountability, founded on an equitable distribution of wealth and
power, is the best way to make sure that government interventions benefit the public
rather than a powerful few, and correct market failures rather than exacerbating
them. The results will be as imperfect as democracy itself, but better than the
practical alternatives. As Winston Churchill famously remarked, "Democracy is the
worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried." In
framing environmental policies, the key challenge is not to strike the right balance
between states and markets-important as that may be-but rather toNATURAL RESOURCES TO NATURAL ASSETS / 283
ensure that the policy mix is chosen democratically, with an equal voice for all whose
lives are affected.
Sanctified and Instrumental Property Rights
Throughout U.S. history, property rights have undergone reallocation and
redefinition. Gerald Friedman has traced the longstanding conflict in American
jurisprudence between "sanctified" and "instrumental" conceptions of property
rights [45]. In the sanctified view, property rights can and should be clearly defined
and perfectly secure; indeed, this is perceived as an overarching social end-in-itself.
In the instrumental view, property rights are a means toward more fundamental
ends, such as efficiency, growth, and justice (or injustice, as in the case of property
restrictions designed to enforce race discrimination). Both schools of thought
recognize, of course, that property rights are socially constructed-creations of human
law, not divine ordination-but proponents of the sanctified view tend to regard this
as a once-and-for-all fait accompli, while proponents of the instrumental view tend
to see it as an open-ended process, responding to ongoing changes in values,
technology, and institutions.
The mainstream view of property rights in the United States has been firmly
instrumental, as Friedman documents. Early in the 19th century, for example, the
courts redefined property rights to remove impediments to both private
entrepreneurship and public infrastructure. In 1877, in the case Munn v. Illinois, the
Supreme Court declared that "a government may regulate the conduct of its citizens
toward each other, and, when necessary for the public good, the manner in which
each shall use his own property." In the latter half of the 20th century, Congress and
the states further redefined property rights to protect the environment and
occupational health and safety.
In recent decades, under the banner of "free-market environmentalism," some
authors have argued not only for greater reliance on market-based instruments for
environmental protection, but also for a radical shift toward the sanctified view of
property rights [46]. They portray any government regulations that constrain what
firms or individuals can do with property as "takings," for which property owners
ought to be compensated by the government. In this view, property rights are
defined such that landowners are deemed to hold all rights not explicitly withheld by
prior law or explicitly held by others. In this model, there are no ambiguities as to the
prerogatives of ownership: unless already specified otherwise, all sticks in the
property-rights bundle belong to those who hold the biggest stick, the title. Even
though the right to drain and build on a wetland is not explicitly granted by prior law,
for instance, any government action that blocks such development is construed as
taking that right from the landowner-a default solution that dismisses the rights of
everyone else. This line of reasoning conveniently ignores the extent to which the
private property for which the law is so solicitous was itself created by the usurpation
of other property rights, notably those of Native284 / BOYCE
Americans [47]. It also ignores the extent to which current private property values
are augmented by "givings" resulting from government action, such as proximity to
publicly funded infrastructure.
Economist Daniel Bromley terms the extreme pursuit of takings compensation a
"demand to be paid for no longer being allowed to undertake activities now declared
to be illegal," and compares it to extortion [48]. Laws generally do infringe on
people's ability to do whatever they wish-otherwise they would be unnecessary-and
in some cases, this infringement reduces the value of a property below what it would
otherwise be. The claim that any such impacts represent takings presumes not only
that property rights have been perfectly specified, but also that the law too has been
perfectly specified, at least insofar as it affects property values. Hence there is no
scope for new laws or regulations unless they are accompanied by side-payments to
those whose property values would be adversely affected, in effect turning legislation
into a market exchange.
In practice, however, property rights are neither fully specified nor immutable: as
societies change over time, so do the ways they define and allocate property.
Bromley remarks:
[T]o have a right is to have the ability to require some authority system to act
in your behalf-that is, to act so as to protect your particular interest against
the interests of others. In the starkest possible terms, what I own is a function
of what the other members of the polity say I own-not what I say I own [48,
p. 653; emphasis in the original.]
What others say that a person owns can, and does, change through time. Until the
U.S. Civil War, for example, many states explicitly recognized property rights in
humans as slaves; as Friedman observes, the abolition of slavery represented a huge
(and uncompensated) redefinition of property rights, brought about by changes in
values and in balances of power.
The plasticity of property rights, and their role as an instrument in pursuit of a
society's broader goals, has far-reaching implications for natural asset-building
strategies. First and foremost, it suggests that there is considerable scope for building
natural assets via the routes of redistribution, internalization, and appropriation-all of
which involve the reconfiguration of property rights-as well as via investment.
Second, once we reject the sanctified view of property rights and the presumptive
allocation of all unspecified rights to landowners, there is no compelling reason why
proponents of market-based approaches to environmental protection should object
to allocations of property rights that favor the poor. If, as free-market
environmentalists often assert, well-defined property rights foster efficient outcomes
regardless of how the rights are distributed, why not allocate emerging rights in
natural assets-including rights to environmental sinks-equally among all citizens? If
poverty reduction and the equitable distribution of wealth and power figure among a
society's objectives, then there are strong grounds to preferNATURAL RESOURCES TO NATURAL ASSETS / 285
an egalitarian allocation rather than the assignment of these rights to those already
best-endowed with assets. In addition, as discussed above, there are good environ-
mental reasons to favor an equitable distribution of rights to natural assets.
A final implication is that successful efforts to build natural assets in the hands of
the poor inevitably bring the risk that more powerful parties will attempt to wrest
control of those assets by legal, illegal, or quasi-legal means. There is a danger, in
other words, that the poor will no longer be too poor to rob, but that they will
remain too weak politically to defend themselves from the would-be robbers. It
would be a sad irony if investments in ecological restoration by small farmers or
woodlot owners, or the internalization of benefits from the ecological services they
provide, were to prompt others to deprive them of their land. That risk does not
diminish the case for natural asset-building strategies, but it means that efforts to
build assets in the hands of the poor must be accompanied by efforts to strengthen
their capacity to defend their assets. Struggles to democratize environmental
ownership will require parallel struggles to democratize the political framework,
including efforts to organize communities, protect human rights, and improve access
to legal assistance. Natural asset-building strategies neglect these elements of social
and political capital at their peril-or, more precisely, at the peril of those they aim to
assist.
Building natural assets can advance the goals of poverty reduction, environmental
protection, and environmental justice. Yet the very features of natural assets that
make successes possible-the ongoing reconfiguration of property rights to natural
resources, and the human capacity to increase or decrease our stock of natural
assets-carry the possibility of failure, too. In the 21st century, many critical issues of
environmental ownership will be resolved for better or worse. The challenge we face
is to resolve them for the better.
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